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THE INDEPENDENCE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE POLITICAL 
ATTITUDES OF OLIVET NAZARENE UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, 2010 - 2013 
David Claborn and Lindsey Tobias 
This paper maps peoples’ politics onto three axes to see how those axes interrelate.  617 
Midwestern faith-based university students answered 10 questions on social issues, 12 
questions on economic issues, and 11 questions on foreign affairs.  This project is 
specifically interested in knowing if the social and economic answers explain the foreign 
affairs answers.  The biggest conclusion drawn is how little they do.  One’s social and 
economic attitudes predict 5.5% of one’s foreign affairs.  We can also conclude that 
social attitudes of these students drive party identification much more than economic or 
foreign affairs as students identify as Republican four-to-one, yet tilt left on economic 
issues and foreign affairs. 
 
Finding out the unique political personalities of those with whom you work is a fun part of the job of 
political science professors.  This paper is borne out a questionnaire we offered to students over a three 
year period.  Olivet Nazarene University takes pride in having a conservative theology as does the 
denomination.  They also both come out of a desire to serve the poor and needy and that calling has 
stayed vibrant for more than a hundred years.  So we come to the data with questions of how caring for 
the underprivileged balance out against a strong sense of public morality. 
After going over how the data was collected, we’ll describe some interesting findings.  For members of 
the Olivet community this will be the most interesting part of the paper.  Then we plot the students’ 
answers into a figure we think may suss out some conclusions.  That figure is a cube comprising three 
dimensions or axes: social issues and economic issues making up the first two (and will seem very 
familiar to students of politics.)  But a third and novel axis to join to the conventional two is foreign 
affairs.  In a separate paper Claborn proposes this 3-D schema as a way to allow the diversity within 
political groupings, without losing the elegance of a diagram.
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Methodology 
In this second phase of the project we asked 617 students
2
 10 questions on social regulation, 12 
questions on economic regulation, and 11 questions on foreign policy over five semesters.  Those 
questions and the results from each are on the next page.  Based on their answers to these questions, 
we recognized each student’s overall attitude on social regulation, on economic regulation, and on 
foreign affairs.  Their average social answer, average economic answer, and average foreign affairs 
answer then made up their attitude score.  Each score then became an x-coordinate, y-coordinate and z-
coordinate, and voila, the 3-D schematic is created. 
 
The social regulation measure (SocialReg in our dataset) was constructed from four social issues 
(abortion, euthanasia, marijuana laws and pornography) and sought to find the respondent’s attitude 
against what is already legal or the norm.  Abortion, because it is such a long lived issue and can be seen 
as something of a bellwether on social regulation in general, was given more and contextualized 
questions.
3
  Ten questions with three and five part answer options were adjusted to fit on a scale of -1 
to 0 to 1.  If a student answered in the least regulatory way possible on all questions, their score was -1, 
most regulatory answers possible was 1, and 0 then is point in between.     
 
The economic regulation measure (EconReg) was constructed from the twelve questions on attitudes 
toward public spending on racial issues, crime, education, drugs, environment, parks, poverty, health, 
foreign aid, the role of taxes and the minimum wage.  The same -1 to 1 scale was used with -1 being the 
score of someone who answered in the least regulatory way possible, 1 is the most, and 0 as the 
midpoint.   
 
The foreign affairs measure (ForeignAffairs) questions are not focused in some of the ways political 
scientists would expect.  They are not measuring idealism and realism exactly (despite the language 
compromises made for the narrative above).  They are not hoping to capture interventionism against 
isolationism, militarism against pacifism, or multilateralism v. unilateralism.  They are hoping to capture 
an impression of all of the above.  This third dimension was to be the students’ take on foreign matters, 
not a more specific opinion on the morality of military usage, for example.  This conception has grander 
goals in mind as the hope is to capture each student’s full constellation of thinking on foreign matters.  
So the questions are not focused, but still do suggest a basic pessimism or optimism about international 
action.  Take a look at the questions and answer options for more clarification.  -1 was the totally 
pessimistic answer, and 1 was the totally optimistic answer, and 0 is the midpoint.   
 
To check internal reliability against meandering attention spans or too-zealous-agreeableness (an error 
of respondent acquiescence), the ideological bent of the answer options varies.  Sometimes it begins 
with liberal, sometimes conservative.  The set of social regulation questions seem the most liable to  
                                                          
2
 In a Midwest residential faith-based university of approx. 2,500 students.  80% of them residential, more than 
80% of which are from Illinois, Michigan, & Indiana, which make up an organizational unit for the university’s 
denomination: the Church of the Nazarene.  30+% of students are Nazarene (with Catholics being the second 
largest tradition), and around 17% are minority students.  So this is a terrible vehicle for extrapolating about larger 
populations. To incentivize taking the poll, I offered an extra credit worth around .1 of one percentage point in the 
class, so participation was not far from voluntary. 
3
 A version of the SocialReg variable with abortion having equal weight with the other three issues was constructed 
and found that abortion did indeed drive much of the willingness to regulate social matters.  Mean=.297, 
median=.400 for the original, and once abortion is allowed equal weight we see a mean of .156, median=.232.  
That’s more than a 40% drop in our SocialReg variable.  Still, because abortion is the social issue of the last several 
decades, letting it have inordinate weight in the model seems appropriate. 
Social Questions: 
What is your opinion on abortion? 
 Legal Illegal Don’t 
know  
When the woman’s life is 
endangered by the 
pregnancy 
55% 20% 25% 
When the woman 
became pregnant as a 
result of rape 
36% 45% 19% 
When there is a strong 
chance of birth defect in 
the baby 
17% 62% 20% 
When the family is low 
income and cannot 
afford any more children 
71% 11% 17% 
When the woman is not 
married and does not 
want to marry the man 
9% 74% 17% 
For any reason 9% 70% 21% 
 
A person should have the right to end their own 
life 
For any reason 11% 
Because they are tired of living and ready to 
die 0.2% 
Because they have an incurable disease 15% 
Because they have asked not to be 
resuscitated if they fall unconscious  9% 
Never 65% 
 
Which statement best describes your view 
There should 
be no laws 
against 
pornography 
There should be 
laws against 
pornography for 
those younger 
than 18 
There should 
be laws 
against 
pornography 
7% 45% 48% 
 
Do you think marijuana should be made 
legal or kept illegal 
Should be 
made legal 
Should remain 
illegal 
Don’t 
know 
34% 44% 22% 
 
Economic Questions: 
Are we spending too much, too little, or 
about the right amount on… 
 Too 
much 
About the 
right 
amount 
Too 
little 
Improving the 
conditions of 
blacks/African 
Americans 
33% 22% 44% 
Halting the rising 
crime rate 
9% 52% 40% 
Education 7% 70% 22% 
Dealing with 
drug addiction 
21% 37% 41% 
Improving and 
protecting the 
environment 
25% 38% 36% 
Parks and 
recreation 
22% 28% 49% 
Assistance for 
the poor 
29% 41% 30% 
Improving and 
protecting the 
nation’s health  
29% 37% 33% 
Assistance to 
other countries  
51% 19% 30% 
Spending on 
national defense 
33% 26% 41% 
 
Taxes for “rich people” are 
Too high 22% 
About right 32% 
Too low 46% 
 
Foreign Affairs Questions: 
How Important are the following issues? 
 Very 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Not 
important 
at all 
Promoting market 
economies abroad 
19% 66% 14% 
Promoting and defending 
human rights in other 
countries 
54% 42% 4% 
Helping to bring a 
democratic form of 
government to other 
nations 
16% 61% 23% 
Strengthening the United 
Nations (and other 
international 
organizations) 
33% 54% 13% 
Combating international 
terrorism 
60% 38% 3% 
Combating world hunger  69% 29% 2% 
Promoting the spread of 
nuclear weapons 
67% 31% 2% 
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Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Don’t 
Know Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
The government should 
try to lessen the gap 
between rich and poor 
14% 24% 16% 36% 9%  
 28% 39% 14% 13% 6% Patriotism is an overrated quality 
 37% 48% 8% 6% 2% It our leader meets with our 
enemies it makes us appear weak 
 7% 21% 29% 35% 6% We must use our military power 
from time to time to protect our 
supply of oil, to avoid a national 
crisis 
 29% 43% 13% 11% 4% It does not make sense to try to 
understand terrorists because they 
are self-evidently evil 
 
 
Language for these questions was taken from professional polling organizations.  All of the social regulation language was originally crafted in the General Social Survey (GSS), as was the 
language for all spending questions, and the gap between rich and poor language.  Language for the questions on taxes and how important the specific foreign affairs events came from the 
National Elections Survey (NES).  The last four questions (Patriotism, meeting with enemies, militant oil, and understanding terrorists) came from aforementioned political compass popularizer 
David Nolan’s website, gotoquiz.com/politics/political-spectrum-quiz.html.   
acquiescence issues since an opinion option in twelve of the thirteen questions is “about right”.  
Searching for those who answered “about right” every chance they could, we find 8 respondents did so.  
Their answers in the other two planes showed normal variance, thou
respondents from giving answers they think the professor wants to read (also known as a social 
desirability error), the respondents were anonymous.  To keep their anonymity, the webhost acted as a 
third party and sent back a list of email addresses which completed the survey, with no means to trace 
to answers. 
 
Like other scholars doing similar work, we must admit that the questions and answer options here leave 
something to be desired in terms of reliability and validity
checking the database, and using language taken from the GSS, NES and (an admittedly less credible 
popular attitudinal grapher) politicalcompass.com all still confirm that the dataset is stable, as error
as we can get it, and capturing the referents we hope to capture.
 
• Upperclassmen were twice as likely as underclassmen to reject euthanasia laws, and 
reject abortion laws “for any reason”, and 35% more likely to reject pornography laws.  But their 
EconReg scores were not significantly different.  Yet upperclassmen self
leaning-Republican at the same rate: 76%
leaning Republicans, or they misidentify themselves at higher clips than their younger counterparts.
• What does misidentification look like then?  
o If we draw a diagonal line across the 
figure, demarcating a Democratic half and 
Republican half created from the 
attitudes, we first notice that there are 
more Republican respondents in our 
sample: 62% to 38%.  But it is not as large 
as the self-identification gap: 76% to 23%.  
Which means 82 responde
lean conservative when their answers 
show them leaning liberal.  That is 13% of 
all answerers or one out of every 7 or 8
which is actually around the average 
error for political self-identification.
o A second impression is how many stud
is how few students end up in the Libertarian quadrant, and how many end up in the 
Communitarian quadrant.  There is literally more than an order of magnitude difference:  32 
Libertarians and 347 students in the fourth quadrant.  
• One’s major is revealing.
6
  Theology majors are the most willing to regulate social affairs, the least 
willing to regulate economically, and are quite pessimistic of international actions.  Education best 
represented our Communitarian quadrant as those respondents were 50% more willing to regulate 
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 “But they’re just more libertarian.”  To answer this question we split libertarians and communitarians into 
Republican halves and Democratic halves, so someone who identifies as Republican yet ended up on the 
democratic half of a libertarian attitude was considered mis
5
 Swedlow, 2009, see table 3, p. 1065. 
6
 College of one’s major is actually the variable since too many majors exist to draw any statistical inferences.
gh, so they were all kept.  To keep 
.  But tests and retests, multiple people error
 
Findings 
-identify as Republican or 
.  This means upperclassmen are either more libertarian 
 
nts said they 
– 
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ents end up in each quadrant.  The most obvious pattern 
 
identified. 
-
-free 
twice as likely to 
4
   
 
 
social affairs than the average, and were the most willing to regulate economic affairs (62% more 
than the average.)  Future educators were the least optimistic in the international 
• Gender differences are more pronounced at Olivet than nationwide differences.  An average Olivet 
woman is more economically liberal than 70% of Olivet men, and more socially conservative and 
internationally optimistic than men as well.
• ACT scores  
o positively correlated with a religiosity variable that was created from one’s self
strength of that identity, and attendance.
other words.  It is speculative and controversial, but sports based financial aid could explain 
some or much of this finding.  A sports scholarship provides motivations to attend a faith
school that are both not academic and not faith
and less religiously-active; it is saying athletic money incentivizes students who otherwise would 
not be attracted to a university that is faith based.
o were also significantly related to party identification.  Look at the strange relationship with our 
two-party system –from highest to lowest:  
Libertarian (26.3),  
None, but leaning Republican (26.0), 
None, but leaning Democratic (25.6), 
then Republican (24.9),  
then Democratic (24.4).   
This clear pattern of higher ACT scores correlating with those further from the 2
disrupted by those who answered None
o ACT scores are positively correlated with more cons
significantly), yet they predicted different actual policy wishes:  less regulation on euthanasia 
and marijuana laws, but spending on assisting the poor is “too little.”
• Religiosity correlated with more pacifist answers
more conservative political self-ID.
 
There are more telling conclusions that we can draw about Olivet student politics, though.  Below we 
plot the student answers into the previously mentione
adding a 3
rd
 dimension (foreign affairs) to the social and economic answers tells us before concluding.
 
Graphing the data   
Like most indices of social phenomena, they cluster at the center, 
which shows an expected moderation.
 
To see the relationships between the three axes better, the 2
scatterplots which make up the cube are below:
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 The variable was constructed as follows.  
the equivalent, it was coded as 0, and only that information was used for this variable.  
strength of that religious identity:  strongly identify, somewhat identify, or not very strongly.  And 
7 gradations: never, around once a year, several times a year, once a month, 2
than once a week. 
sphere, as well.   
 
7
  Higher ACT scores predicted higher religiosity, in 
-based.  This is not saying athletes are less smart 
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 rather than militaristic, and also correlated with a 
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d 3-dimensional cube. Then we describe what
 
-D 
 
ReligiousIdentity was a text box, and if the respondent typed “none” or 
Belonging
-3 times a month, weekly, more 
 
-description, 
-based 
-party system is 
 
 
 
 asked for 
Attendance has 
Imagine holding a cube in your hand and looking at three faces 
oriented:  as if you were looking at one side, then rotate and look at another, then look at the top.  
On these questions at least, Olivet Nazarene students are 
• conservative on social issues (more willing to regulate than not:  .2968, on a 
• slightly left leaning on economic issues (more willing to regulate than not:  .13 on a 
• optimistic in foreign affairs (more principled/moral than pragmatic/realistic:  
scale.)  More discussion on their relationship is in the next subsection. 
 
The scatterplots make it easier to see the basic findings.  For the foreign affa
center of gravity to the left, which is toward optimistic/idealistic answers.  The social regulation tilts to 
the right, or the more regulatory attitude.  And the median of the social regulation variable says perhaps 
more:  if you cut the data into fifths, a full half of answerers are in the two most regulatory quintiles.  
 
Adding the Foreign Affairs Axis to our Social and Economic Axes
When we add a foreign affairs axis and create a cube, we can then answer if domestic attit
correlate with those foreign affairs answers.  We explain below that the social and economic axes do 
significantly predict the foreign affairs axis, but with surprisingly little power.  Then we describe some 
patterns within the ideological quadrants. 
 
Using a linear regression we answer specifically “does the 2
Republicans, Libertarians and our fourth quadrant explain or predict the 3
Answer:  yes, and to a statistically signific
of one’s foreign affairs opinions.  That is worth repeating.  Even after asking a student 22 questions 
about social and economic regulation, those answers can tell us only around a 
opinions on foreign affairs will be.  “But Republicans will be more militant, Democrats more peace
seeking, and Libertarians less governmental in foreign affairs, right?”  If we blur our eyes and seek 
evidence to back our presuppositions, then y
 
–that’s how these three graphs are 
 
-1 to 1 scale)
-.2971, on a 
 
irs variable, notice the clear 
 
  
-D face of the square showing Democrats, 
rd
 dimension 
ant degree.  But shockingly the 2-D square only predicts 
twentieth
es, we can find that to be true.  But five-point
 
 
-1 to 1 scale) 
-1 to 1 
 
udes 
–foreign affairs?”  
5.5% 
 of what their 
-
-five percent 
of foreign affairs attitudes are explained by our knowledge of one’s political attitude.  That strikes us as 
one really small number.  
 
One reason for this counterintuitive finding could be how lousy we are at actually answering like the 
party we claim describes us.  The note on misidentification above speaks to this as well.  So yes, self-
identified Republicans tend to be more militant, and Democrats peaceniks on the oil question and 
several others, as presented below.  But once you take into account all the respondent’s other answers, 
which often vary from some supposed party-line, then only roughly a twentieth of the time is there a 
configuration of someone like a predictable Republican, who then goes on to have consistently more 
militaristic answers (or whatever conventional wisdom you want to ascribe to being Republican).  We 
are human.  We refuse to be encapsulated by simple terms like “Republican” or “Democrat”.  
Generalizing a Republican or Democratic foreign policy seems to cloud more than clarify –not unlike the 
original left to right spectrum this whole paper hopes to throw into doubt.   
 
To be sure, we ran the regression with each individual question to see if there were counter-acting 
variables and the conventional wisdom was instead really correct, minus some pesky broken questions.  
But there were none.  Even when cheating and cherry picking the few significant variables and creating a 
model from them, we can still only explain 8% of the variance on foreign affairs. 
 
Does each ideological bent have a distinct attitude on foreign affairs?   
There are two answers here.  Within quadrant variation –there was only one: the libertarians.  30% of 
their attitudes on foreign affairs were explained by their views on social regulation.  The relationship 
was negative: meaning the more likely libertarians were to regulate social affairs (which, remember is 
defined here as left of center), the more pessimistic they were on foreign affairs, and vice versa.  Put 
another way, more ideological Libertarians are also more optimistic abroad; more socially pragmatic 
Libertarians are likewise less idealistic about foreign affairs. 
 
The second answer is across the quadrants rather than within the quadrants.  And here the libertarians 
and communitarians are not significantly different from each other or the liberals and conservatives.  
But the Democratic quadrant (which tilted more idealistic) and the Republican quadrant (which tilted 
more realistic) were significantly different.  When Democrats and Republicans are isolated, do they 
show a significant pattern in foreign affairs opinions, then?  Yes, as suggested.  The difference between 
Democratic foreign affairs opinions are almost twice as far from 0 as Republicans.
8
   
 
What about when you cut the data into four equal parts: the most Libertarian, Republican, Democratic 
and Communitarian quarters of the answerers?
9
  Do you then see foreign affairs differences?  Yes, and 
with similar results:  Communitarians as the most idealistic, a tick more than Dems, and Republicans are 
the least idealistic, at around 63% of what the Communitarian answerers gave.  Yet note that the more 
Republican answerers is still idealistic –a full 22 percentage-points away from the 0. 
 
Is looking at one axis predictive?  Not for the social regulation measure –the results were insignificant.  
Not a single social regulatory question shows a significant correlation.  But the economic measure is 
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 154 Republicans have a foreign affairs measure 22 percentage points to the more idealistic side of 0, and 84 
Democrats have a measure 34 points to the more idealistic than 0.  P<.001 
9
 We did this by simply drawing median lines up and down, left and right. 
significant and negative.  That means the more libertarian one’s economic views, the more realist their 
foreign affairs views.
10
   
 
The following chart shows this relationship.  We broke up EconReg into roughly ten parts, from least 
regulatory to most.   
Foreign Affairs Attitudes by Economic Outlook 
Economic Measure broken Roughly 
into Tenths (Deciles) 
Foreign Affairs, From 
Idealistic (-1.00) to 
Realistic (1.00) 
N 
Least Economically Regulatory Tenth  
(or Libertarian Economics) -.20 55 
-.363 - -.150 -.21 75 
-.149 - -.045 -.28 56 
-.044 - .091 -.28 60 
.092 - .150 -.29 72 
.151 - .227 -.33 21 
.228 - .318 -.30 69 
.319 - .455 -.34 94 
.456 - .591 -.35 64 
Most Economically Regulatory Tenth  
(or Socialist Economics) -.39 51 
Total -.30 617 
 
With a correlation score of -.234, the table shows that with the exception of one row, each decile grows 
more idealistic than the one before.   
 
If we break down the economic index to find out which questions drive this correlation, only three of the 
twelve are significant: spending on health care, the role of minimum wage, and spending on foreign aid 
not surprisingly and perhaps tautologically.  And those three alone explain 9.3% of the variance of the 
foreign affairs variable. 
 
Yet another way of trying to understand the foreign affairs views of the answerer is via their self-claimed 
partisanship.  How much does party explain?  1.5% exactly.  It is statistically significant, but that is one 
small amount of the clustering that party ID tells us –so small we are inclined to say that it simply does 
not explain it. 
 
Conclusion 
These quite faithful students
11
 display the characteristics of the university and denomination: a 
willingness to regulate economically (for the underprivileged, perhaps), coupled with a willingness to 
regulate social affairs as well (to reduce publicly damaging behavior, such as drugs, euthanasia and 
abortions.)  Textbooks place this political disposition squarely in a communitarian or populist or 
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 Specifically, the relationship has a correlation score of -.234, p<.001 
11
 Less than 5% can be categorized as “none” for religious tradition versus a nationwide average of 20% per Pew 
Research Center.  See footnote 7 for construction of the religious tradition variable.  
“inclusive social hiearch”
12
 quadrant of a political map.  It essentially leans Democratic on economic 
matters and a Republican on social matters.  And with this paper we now know that it strongly 
correlates with an idealistic or liberal leaning on foreign affairs.
13
 
 
In our data, we found that only three questions drive the significance in the already weak explanation of 
foreign affairs (attitudes toward spending on health care, foreign affairs, and the minimum wage.)  We 
also find that the conventional wisdom on the foreign affairs of Democrats and Republicans holds true.  
Communitarians are the most idealistic, then Democrats, then Libertarians, with Republicans as the 
most Realistic (in international relations terms.)  Yet that same confirmation is almost comically weak as 
one’s party self-identification explains only 1.5% of his or her foreign affairs. 
 
So with surprising independence from the social and economic axes, an axis on foreign affairs seems like 
a great candidate for further study.  Specifically, future research questions could ask if there are 
patterns to the clustering of attitudes within the cube.  Only 5% of the foreign affairs variance is 
explained by the social and economic questions, but that crude regression score still leaves room for 
some more advanced metrics to find patterns not found here.   
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 Swedlow, B., “Beyond liberal and conservative: Two-dimensional conceptions of ideology and the structure of 
political attitudes and values” Journal of Political Ideologies June 2008 13 (2): 157-180 
13
 “Liberal” in an international relations sense, that is.  Which “rejects power politics” and is based on “the need for 
international cooperation, distribution of shared interests, and the role of non-state actors in shaping state 
preferences and policy choices.”  Shiraev, E. and Zubok, V.  (2014) International Relations. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
